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A NEW APPROACH TO CIVIL COMMITMENT OF
THE MENTALLY ILL
I. INTRODUCTION
Civil commitment in institutions became the socially accepted
method of caring for the mentally ill in the late nineteenth century.'
Today, every jurisdiction provides for involuntary civil commitment
of mentally ill individuals who meet certain commitment standards.2
Several courts, however, have found that these commitment stan-
dards impermissibly restrict patients' fourteenth amendment right to
liberty3 by allowing confinement of individuals who could ade-
quately survive outside of an institution.4 Accordingly, these courts
have struck down civil commitment statutes because they are uncon-
I. Comment, The Constitutional Right to Treatment Servicesfor the Noncommitted
Mentally Disabled, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 675, 676 (1980).
2. See Comment, Judicial Schizophrenia. An Involuntarily Confined Mental Pa-
tient's Right to Refuse Anti-Psychotic Drugs, 51 UMKC L. REV. 74 (1982). See also
Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190, 1202-05 & nn. 11-15 (1974) (listing and analyzing the differences between state
voluntary commitment statutes).
3. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. It is clearly settled that involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons is
within the liberty and property interests protected by the due process clause. See, e.g.,
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975)(Burger, C.J., concurring) (involun-
tary commitment to a mental hospital "is a deprivation of liberty which the State
cannot accomplish without due process of law"); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 655 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)); Commonwealth
ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. 155, 168-69, 339 A.2d 764, 768 (1975) (involun-
tary commitment involves a major curtailment of liberty "subject to and regulated by
the Due Process Clause"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 960 (1976).
4. Commitment standards drawn too broadly without sufficiently objective crite-
ria allowed confinement of individuals in institutions "whose detention or treatment
[was not] supported by sufficient governmental interests." Dix, Major Current Issues
Concerning Civil Commitment Criteria, 45 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 138 (1982).
The Supreme Court has noted that although a person is mentally ill, involuntary con-
finement solely because of mental illness is unconstitutional if he is "dangerous to no
one and can live safely in freedom." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575
(1975).
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stitutionally vague and overbroad.5 Subsequently, many states have
attempted to cure these constitutional defects by setting narrowly cir-
cumscribed commitment standards.6 The trend in civil commitment
reform is to permit commitment only upon a finding of a mental dis-
ability that renders the individual dangerous to himself or to others,
or unable to meet his personal needs.7 Since courts and legislatures
have implemented these new standards, many institutionalized indi-
viduals who no longer meet the commitment criteria have become
eligible for release.8 Several of these patients, however, still require
treatment and care and are unable to survive solely on their own
outside of an institution.9 This Recent Development addresses the
problem of providing further treatment and care for mentally ill per-
sons who no longer require institutionalization, without restricting
their constitutionally protected rights.
Part II of this Recent Development will focus on prior judicial and
legislative attempts to provide the means for treating mentally ill pa-
tients while simultaneously protecting the patients' right to liberty.'0
Part III of this Recent Development will examine the approach re-
cently announced by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re S.L, t
which provides treatment for those mentally ill persons who are un-
able to live without some level of institutional care, but no longer
meet civil commitment standards.' 2
5. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. 155, 180-84,
339 A.2d 764, 776-79 (1975)("need of care" requirement for involuntary commitment
violates substantive due process and is unconstitutionally vague), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 960 (1976); State ex rel Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 437-39, 202 S.E.2d
109, 123-24 (1974) (in "need of custody, care or treatment" requirement for involun-
tary hospitalization is unconstitutionally vague and invites abuse). For a discussion
of civil commitment reform, see Dix, supra note 4, at 137-54. See also infra text ac-
companying notes 13-50.
6. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
7. Dix, supra note 4, at 140. Some jurisdictions also require a finding that the
patient's decision-making capacity is impaired as a result of the mental disability. ld
at 149-50. See also infra note 50 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., InreS.L., 94 N.J. 128, 130-31, 462 A.2d 1252, 1253 (1983) (discussion
of the nine patients). See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 14 & 21-24 and accompanying text.
11. 94 N.J. 128, 462 A.2d 1252 (1983).
12. For a discussion of civil commitment standards, see infra notes 13-50 and ac-
companying text.
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II. PRIOR TREATMENT EFFORTS AND THE PATIENT'S RIGHT TO
LIBERTY
A. Constitutional Standards for Civil Commitment
Lower federal courts that first became involved in mental health
reform recognized that mentally ill persons who may need supervi-
sion for their own protection may not need the restrictiveness of an
institution.' 3 These courts sought to preserve the patients' constitu-
tional right to liberty 4 while allowing protective care by mandating
commitment in the least restrictive environment. 15  The Wyatt v.
Stickney'6 decisions are a group of landmark decisions which held
13. See, e.g., Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (a deprivation
of liberty solely because a mentally ill person may not be able to care for himself
without civil commitment should not go beyond what is necessary for his protection),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965).
14. See supra note 3 and infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the right to liberty in O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
15. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863
(1965); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1133 (D. Hawaii 1976) (state bears
the burden of placing civilly committed individuals in the least restrictive environ-
ment); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1219 (E.D. La. 1976) (obligating the
state to give thoughtful consideration to placing a civilly committed mental patient in
the least restrictive environment; however, the state is not required to develop a new
system of facilities); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974)(the state
bears the burden of placing involuntarily committed mentally ill persons in the least
restrictive environment), rey'don other grounds, 651 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1981); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 396 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aft'd in part, remanded in part on
other grounds sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See also
New Jersey Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 89 N.J.
234, 239, 445 A.2d 704, 705-06 (1982) (mentally retarded patients have a statutory
right to treatment in settings least restrictive of their personal liberty); State v. Krol,
68 N.J. 236, 258-60, 344 A.2d 289, 300-01 (1975) (confinement must reasonably mini-
mize infringements on liberty and autonomy). But see Sanchez v. New Mexico, 80
N.M. 438, 441,457 P.2d 370, 372-73 (1969) (institutionalized mentally ill persons may
be deprived of their liberty for the good of society or themselves; confinement is not a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law, but merely a temporary restraint on
liberty), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 276 (1970).
For an overview of the trend towards de-institutionalization of the mentally ill, see
generally Note, The Due Process of Community Treatment of the Mentally I: A Case
Study, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1481 (1981); Rapson, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Receive
Treatment in the Community, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 193 (1980); Comment, supra note 1.
16. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aft'd in part, remanded/n part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (the case name changed because
Aderholt replaced Stickney as Executive Officer of the Alabama State Mental Health
Board). Wyatt v. Stickney is the case name for several federal district court decisions
that established minimum constitutional standards for adequate care and treatment at
1984]
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that mentally ill persons have a constitutional right to treatment in
the least restrictive environment. 7 The Wyatt decisions proved sig-
nificant because the district court established remedial steps to
achieve constitutionally adequate treatment for the mentally ill. 8
Thus, Wyatt attempted to de-institutionalize civilly committed pa-
tients who needed limited care rather than total confinement.' 9
The United States Supreme Court first confronted the issue of con-
stitutional standards for civil commitment in O'Connor v. Donald-
son.2" In O'Connor, Kenneth Donaldson challenged his fifteen-year
civil commitment in a mental hospital on the ground that the hospital
several Alabama state mental hospitals. See 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (es-
tablishing minimum standards for adequate treatment at Partlow State School and
Hospital); 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (ordering minimum standards for ade-
quate care and treatment at Bryce and Searcy State Hospitals); 334 F. Supp. 1341
(M.D. Ala. 1971) (minimum standards for adequate treatment of the mentally ill at
Bryce and Searcy State Hospitals judicially formulated); 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971) (patients involuntarily committed to Bryce State Hospital deprived of constitu-
tional right to receive treatment that would give each patient a realistic opportunity to
be cured or improve their mental condition). For a general discussion of Wyatt, see
generally Note, The Wyatt Case.- Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Insti-
tutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
17. See, e.g., 344 F. Supp. at 396. The Wyatt court set out constitutional mini-
mum standards for adequate habilitation in a detailed appendix to its decision. ld at
395-407. The standards included a threshold decision that institutional commitment
is the least restrictive setting for habilitation and treatment. Id at 396.
18. Id at 395-407. The Wyatt court described conditions at the state institution as
overcrowded, nontherapeutic, dehumanizing, and plagued by fire and other emer-
gency hazards. Id at 391. The court then held that these conditions caused constitu-
tionally deficient treatment of the mentally ill. Id at 390. To ensure that the
institution would upgrade its conditions and treatment to meet constitutional stan-
dards, the court established constitutional minimum standards in its appendix. Id.
19. Since the mid-nineteenth century, three great reform movements have evolved
in mental health care. The first, in 1830, involved the state's acceptance of responsi-
bility for the mentally ill with the establishment of asylums. The second, in 1900,
began the advent of psychotherapy and prevention. Finally, in 1960, the de-institu-
tionalization trend commenced with psychotropic medication enabling many mental
patients to survive outside the institution. Gosling & Ray, Historical Perspectives on
the Treatment of Mental Illness in the United States, 10 J. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 135
(1982). Professionals in the field of psychiatry have become concerned about the ade-
quacy of care provided for mentally ill persons in the community. John Talbott, pro-
fessor of psychiatry at Cornell University Medical College, states that because of de-
institutionalization, patients often find themselves isolated and in substandard com-
munity settings. Id at 156.
20. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). O'Connor was the first mental health case to reach the
United States Supreme Court. Meisel, The Rights of the Mentally Ill Under State
Constitutions, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 10 (1982).
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had deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty.2I The
Supreme Court, finding that Donaldson had been confined un-
justly,2 2 held that a state cannot constitutionally confine a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving in freedom, by
himself or with the help of others, unless other factors are present to
justify his commitment. 23 The Court based its reasoning on a consti-
21. 422 U.S. at 565. In O'Connor, the state civilly committed Kenneth Donaldson
to confinement as a mentally ill person at Florida State Hospital. Donaldson's father
had initiated the commitment in 1957 because he believed that his son was suffering
from delusions. Id At the civil commitment hearing, the judge determined that
Donaldson was suffering from "paranoid schizophrenia" and ordered him committed
for "care, maintenance, and treatment," pursuant to Florida's commitment statute.
Id at 565-66.
The evidence at trial showed that the hospital had the authority to release a patient
posing no danger to himself or to others, even if he had been committed lawfully. Id
at 567. Yet, Donaldson remained in Florida State Hospital for the following 15 years
despite his repeated demands for release. Id at 565. Trial testimony demonstrated
that Donaldson had not been a danger to others during confinement or at any other
time during his life. Id at 568. No evidence existed that Donaldson had been sui-
cidal or likely to harm himself. Id One of the defendants acknowledged that Don-
aldson could have earned a living outside the hospital, and in fact, Donaldson secured
employment after his release. Id Testimony also showed that during Donaldson's
confinement three persons sent in requests for his release and offered to care for him.
Id. at 567-68.
Treatment in the hospital consisted of confinement without any program to allevi-
ate or cure Donaldson's alleged illness. Id at 569. For a discussion of O'Connor, see
Meisel, supra note 20, at 10-13; Note, Donaldson, Dangerousness, and the Right to
Treatment, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (1976).
22. 422 U.S. at 576. Justice Stewart, writing for an unanimous Court, accepted
the jury's findings that Donaldson was neither dangerous to himself nor to others, and
if mentally ill, he had not received treatment. Id at 573. The jury's conclusions, and
the "abundant evidence" supporting their verdict, convinced the Court that Donald-
son's confinement violated his constitutional right to liberty. Id at 576.
23. 422 U.S. at 576. The Supreme Court explicitly narrowed the issues in
O'Connor to find that a state cannot constitutionally confine nondangerous persons in
institutions when they are capable of surviving in freedom. Id. The court of appeals
had decided the case on broader grounds and held that institutionalized mental pa-
tients had a constitutional right to treatment. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507,
520-21 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court expressly refused to address this issue and
stated that the sole issue presented by Donaldson's case was whether his continued
confinement as a "nondangerous person" violated his constitutional right to liberty.
422 U.S. at 572-73. Professor Dix points out that O'Connor left several unanswered
questions regarding the extent of mentally ill persons' constitutionally protected lib-
erty rights. Professor Dix notes that O'Connor "provides no hint as to the Court's
view of the extent to which 'nondangerous' mentally ill persons can be confined if
treatment is provided; of *hat constitutes 'treatment' that will support such confine-
ment; or of what constitutes 'dangerousness' for purposes of this analysis." Dix, supra
note 4, at 138-39. See also Meisel, supra note 20, at 12-13 ("The Court has not defi-
1984]
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tutional right to liberty.24 Using a due process analysis, the Court
stated that because Donaldson was not a danger to himself or others,
the state lacked an adequate constitutional justification for confining
Donaldson.25 Although the Court found that Florida's commitment
statute allowed confinement of persons solely because of mental ill-
ness,26 this finding did not justify deprivation of an individual's phys-
ical liberty.27
The O'Connor Court left unclear what civil commitment standards
would satisfy due process requirements. 28 The Supreme Court did
not decide whether a state constitutionally could commit a non-
dangerous mentally ill individual solely for the purpose of providing
treatment.29 The Court, however, rejected the idea that a state con-
nitely settled the question of whether or not the Constitution secures a right to treat-
ment, and if so what its boundaries are."). For further discussion of the right to
treatment, see infra note 29.
24. 422 U.S. 573. In dictum, the Court defined the liberty interest protected by
the Constitution as follows: "That a wholly sane and innocent person has a constitu-
tional right not to be physically confined by the State when his freedom will pose a
danger neither to himself nor to others. . . ." Id at 573 n.8. The Court stated that
the mere fact that state law authorized commitment would not be sufficient to justify
deprivation of Donaldson's liberty. Id at 574. Furthermore, the O'Connor Court
found that although a mentally ill person's original confinement may have a constitu-
tionally adequate basis, commitment was unconstitutional when the original basis for
confinement no longer existed. Id at 574-75.
25. Id at 573-74.
26. Id at 574.
27. Id at 575.
28. Id at 573. For a discussion of the state's interest in civil commitment and the
patient's due process protection, see Comment, Mental Health Law-Temporary De-
tention of Voluntary Patients by Hospital Authorities Due Process Issues, 12 N.M.L.
REv. 791 (1982).
29. 422 U.S. at 573. The court of appeals in O'Connor had determined that invol-
untarily committed mentally ill persons have a constitutional right to treatment. 493
F.2d at 520-21. The Supreme Court did not address these issues because they were
not "presented" by the O'Connor case "in its present posture." 422 U.S. at 573. The
Court left unresolved "whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to
others have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State, or
whether the State may compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill individual
for the purpose of treatment." Id at 573.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor, other courts expressly had
found that institutionalized mentally ill individuals have a constitutional right to
treatment. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1314 (5th Cir. 1974). Since the
O'Connor decision, lower courts either have avoided expressly the question whether
the Constitution guarantees involuntarily committed persons a right to treatment or
have indicated that there is no constitutional right to treatment. See, e.g., Bowring v.
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 n.3 (4th Cir. 1977) (expressing no opinion on the right to
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stitutionally could confine mentally ill persons merely to ensure them
better living conditions than they would have in the community.30
Furthermore, the O'Connor Court suggested in dictum, by broadly
defining the term "dangerousness," that a state arguably could in-
treatment in civil commitment cases but stating "in many cases treatment is obviously
called for and is available in some form"); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir.
1976) (court will not consider if mentally ill prisoners have a constitutional right to
treatment).
The courts also have avoided consistently the question whether the Constitution
guarantees a right to treatment for mentally retarded individuals. See, e.g.,
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (leaving unanswered whether institutional-
ized mentally retarded persons have a constitutional right to treatment but holding
that they have fourteenth amendment rights to reasonably safe conditions of confine-
ment, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such minimum adequate
training as required to protect their interests); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31 (1981) (refusing to address the right to treatment issue);
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,
762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (due process does not establish a right to treatment but only
perhaps a right to protection from harm). But see Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp.
1209, 1219 (E.D. La. 1976) (finding a constitutional right to treatment that affords
mentally retarded individuals a reasonable chance to acquire and maintain those life
skills necessary to cope as effectively as an individual's capacity permits). For an
overview of the constitutional right to treatment for mentally retarded persons, see
Note, The "Right" to Habilitation: Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman
andYoungberg v. Romeo, 14 CONN. L. REV. 557 (1982)(right to cure and to treatment
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act); Note, Consti-
tutional Law--The Rights of Inioluntariy Committed Mentally Retarded Persons
Under the Fourteenth Amendment-Youngberg v. Romeo, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 451
(1983) (analyzing the substantive rights of institutionalized mentally retarded persons
under the due process clause).
Other courts have found a statutory right to treatment for civilly committed per-
sons. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Congress
established a statutory right to treatment in the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally
Ill Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1981)); New Jersey Ass'n For Retarded Citizens v.
New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 89 N.J. 234, 238-39, 445 A.2d 704, 705-06 (1982)
(interpreting statute to provide mentally retarded children a right to treatment). For a
discussion of New Jersey's statutory right to treatment, see infra notes 87-92.
30. 422 U.S. at 575. Justice Stewart dismissed the idea that the state constitution-
ally could exercise its parens patriae power to provide custodial care for mentally ill
persons. Justice Stewart stated:
That the State has a proper interest in providing care and assistance to the unfor-
tunate goes without saying. But the mere presence of mental illness does not
disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution.
Moreover, while the State may arguably confine a person to save him from harm,
incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living stan-
dards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the
help of family or friends.
1984]
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clude persons unable for physical or other reasons to avoid the
"hazards of freedom."'" Because the O'Connor Court did not ad-
dress the scope of constitutionally acceptable justifications for civil
commitment, the states were left to determine the appropriate stan-
dards that would satisfy the due process requirements protecting a
patient's right to liberty.
B. State Standards for Civil Commitment
Many state legislatures have interpreted O'Connor as justifying
broad standards for confinement. 32 For example, Missouri,33 Cali-
fornia,34 and Illinois" provide for commitment when a person is, as a
31. Id at 574 n.9. The Court observed that the phrase "dangerous to himself' has
a broader meaning than the foreseeable risk of self-injury or suicide. The Court
noted that "a person is literally 'dangerous to himself if for physical or other reasons
he is helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom either through his own efforts or with
the aid of willing family members or friends." Id
32. See infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text. See also Dix, supra note 4, at
138-48.
33. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 632.005(9)(b), 632.355 (Supp. 1983). Section 632.355-2 of
the Comprehensive Psychiatric Services Act provides that "if the court or jury finds
that the respondent, as the result of mental illness, presents a likelihood of serious
physical harm to himself or others, . . . the court shall order the respondent to be
detained for involuntary treatment. ... Id Section 632.005(9)(b) defines a likeli-
hood of serious physical harm as follows:
A substantial risk that serious physical harm to a person will result because of an
impairment in his capacity to make decisions with respect to his hospitalization
and need for treatment as evidenced by his inability to provide for his own basic
necessities of food, clothing, shelter, safety or medical care.
Id
34. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5008(h)(1), 5213 (Deering 1979). Section 5213
of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act provides: "If, upon evaluation, the person is found
to be in need of treatment because he is, as a result of mental disorder, a danger to
others, or to himself, or gravely disabled, he may be detained for treatment. . . ." Id
Section 5008(h)(1) defines "gravely disabled" as "a condition in which a person, as a
result of mental disorder, is unable to provide for his basic personal needs for food,
clothing or shelter." Id
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §§ 1-119, 3-700 (1983). Section 3-700 of the
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code states that a person subject to
involuntary admission may be admitted to a mental health facility pursuant to a court
order. Section 1-119 defines "person subject to involuntary admission" as follows:
I) A person who is mentally ill and who because of his illness is reasonably
expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or others, in the near
future; or
2) A person who is mentally ill and who because of his illness is unable to
provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself for serious harm.
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result of a mental disorder, a danger to himself or to others or unable
to provide for his basic personal needs. Thus, as O'Connor suggested,
these states allow commitment when a person is unable for physical
or other reasons to avoid the hazards of freedom.
State courts also have authorized broad commitment criteria.36
The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Taylor3 7 found the state's
commitment statute constitutional on its face.38 The statute author-
ized confinement when a court determined that a person was men-
tally ill and "gravely disabled.",39  The statute defined "gravely
disabled" as a condition "in which a person, as a result of mental
illness, is unable to take care of his basic personal needs."40
Although the statute did not define "basic personal needs," the court
refused to invalidate the statute on the ground that further specificity
is not constitutionally required if a person of ordinary intelligence
could understand the meaning of the words.41 The Taylor court then
interpreted the phrase "basic personal needs" to mean "those funda-
mental necessities of human existence, such as food, shelter, clothing,
and medical care, which an individual must obtain and maintain in
order to live safely."42
Other state courts have limited the scope of their commitment stat-
utes by narrowing the commitment criteria.4 3 In Commonwealth ex
rel Finken v. Roop," the Pennsylvania Superior Court invalidated,
on the ground of vagueness, 45 a statute allowing confinement based
on a finding of mental illness that required care.46 Similarly, in State
ex rel Hawks v. Lazaro,47 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
36. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980). For a discussion of
state courts' treatment of their state civil commitment statutes, see Dix, supra note 4.
37. 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).
38. 618 P.2d at 1134.
39. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-107 (1973). See also Taylor, 618 P.2d at 1133.
40. COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-10-102(5) (Supp. 1979). See also Taylor, 618 P.2d at
1134.
41. 618 P.2d at 1134.
42. Id
43. See infra notes 46 & 49 and accompanying text. See also Dix, supra note 4, at
139-49.
44. 234 Pa. Super. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 960 (1976).
45. Id at 183, 339 A.2d at 778.
46. See 50 PA. CONST. STAT. § 4406 (1966). See also Finken, 234 Pa. Super. at
164-65, 339 A.2d at 768-69.
47. 157 W. Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974).
1984]
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peals held its commitment statute unconstitutionally vague and an
invitation for abuse.4 8 The statute allowed commitment when a court
determined that an individual needed custody, care, or treatment in a
hospital and, because of mental illness or retardation, lacked "suffi-
cient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to
his hospitalization. 49
Thus, state courts and legislatures have given different interpreta-
tions to the scope of O'Connor's justifications for civil commitment.
The trend, however, is to authorize commitment when a mental disa-
bility renders a patient dangerous to himself, others, or unable to
meet personal needs.5"
III. IN RE SL.: NEw JERSEY'S APPROACH TO TREATMENT
WITHOUT VIOLATING A PATIENT'S RIGHT TO LIBERTY
A. Background and Discussion
In In re S.L, 5I the New Jersey Supreme Court recently confronted
the problem of finding a means of providing treatment for mentally
ill persons without unnecessarily restricting a patient's liberty.52 In re
S.L. involved a consolidation of nine individual suits that challenged'
orders continuing each person's commitment at Greystone Park Psy-
chiatric Hospital in Morristown, New Jersey.53 Each individual had
spent most of his adult life confined in a mental institution.5 4 The
nine mentally ill patients alleged that they no longer met New
Jersey's legal standards for civil commitment and sought a "Dis-
48. Id at 437, 202 S.E.2d at 113.
49. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4 (1981). See also State ex re. Hawks, 157 W. Va. at 437,
202 S.E.2d at 113.
50. See Dix, supra note 4, at 140. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
51. 94 N.J. 128, 462 A.2d 1252 (1983).
52. See supra notes 3-4 & 14-50 and accompanying text.
53. 94 N.J. at 130-31, 462 A.2d at 1253. In prior proceedings a judge had deter-
mined that seven of the nine patients no longer met the legal standards for commit-
ment but were unable to live independently of the institution. The judge ordered
these seven patients discharged pending placement (DPP). Id A second court re-
fused to recognize the validity of the prior adjudications and found that the seven
patients met the legal commitment standards. The remaining two patients never re-
ceived a DPP status. Id at 131-32, 462 A.2d at 1253-54. For a discussion of the DPP
classification, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
54. 94 N.J. at 130, 462 A.2d at 1253. The following chart indicates the age of the
nine patients on the date of the decision and the commitment date of each patient:
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charged Pending Placement" (DPP) classification. 55
New Jersey legal standards only allow a judge to commit an indi-
vidual because of mental illness if he is a danger to himself, to others,
or to property.5 6 Administrators of the mental health system and
judges in New Jersey found that although many institutionalized pa-
tients no longer met these civil commitment standards, they also were
unable to live independently of an institution.57 Administrators and
judges used the DPP classification to detain these patients in the insti-
Appellant Age Date Committed
S.L. 71 July 30, 1934
A.F. 70 February 13, 1942
P.M. 74 October 22, 1931
F.G. 36 August 21, 1963
R.B. Died at age 78 in 1981 February 8, 1952
E.A. 65 June 28, 1965
C.S. 83 May 12, 1937
J.A. 40 November 17, 1980
R.G. 49 March 6, 1980
Id at 130 n.l, 462 A.2d at 1253 n.1.
Before November 17, 1980, patient J.A. had a nine year commitment in Greystone
Park Psychiatric Hospital. Patient R.G. had intermittent hospitalizations over the
preceding 30 years. Id
Although at the time the New Jersey Supreme Court decided this case patient R.B.
had died and patient R.G. had become a voluntary patient, the court addressed all
nine cases in order to address fully all issues raised by the appeals. Id at 131 n.2, 462
A.2d at 1253 n.2.
55. Id at 131-33, 462 A.2d at 1253-54. New Jersey statutes, administrative regula-
tions, and court rules did not formally recognize the DPP classification. Judges and
mental health administrators, however, often used the classification for patients not
meeting legal commitment standards but unable to survive outside the institution. Id
at 131, 462 A.2d at 1253.
The Public Advocate representing the nine patients urged the court to recognize
formally the DPP status as an intermediate stage between involuntary commitment
and immediate discharge. Id at 133, 462 A.2d at 1254. The Public Advocate urged
that with the promulgation of procedural safeguards, DPP status would ensure that
"patients who are no longer dangerous will be integrated in an expeditous manner
into settings less restrictive of their liberty." Id
56. N.J. Sup. Ct. R. 4:74-7(f). See 94 N.J. at 131, 462 A.2d at 1253. See also State
v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 249, 344 A.2d 289, 296 (1975) (standard of commitment must be
cast in terms of continuing mental illness and dangerousness to oneself or to others-
not solely in terms of continuing mental illness). The Krolcourt stated that a substan-
tial risk of dangerous conduct within the foreseeable future must exist to justify civil
commitment. 68 N.J. at 260, 344 A.2d at 302. Furthermore, the Krol court stated that
once the court determines that a patient is dangerous, the object is to place the patient
only in the necessary degree of restraint. Id at 261-62, 344 A.2d at 302-03.
57. 94 N.J. at 131, 462 A.2d at 1253.
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tution.58 Thus, DPP status enabled the court to discharge technically
nondangerous patients while supervising and caring for them in the
institution pending alternative placement.59
In In re S.L., the New Jersey appellate court had refused to recog-
nize the DPP classification and ordered continuing civil commitment
for the nine patients.6" The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.6
The court held that patients who no longer meet legal commitment
standards and are unable to survive independently of an institution
should be retained temporarily in the institution pending alternative
placement.62
The New Jersey Supreme Court directly confronted an issue in In
re S.L not decided by O'Connor63 and the Wyatt6 line of cases: 65 in
the absence of less restrictive alternative placements, what should the
state do with mentally ill persons who need care and supervision but
58. Id See supra note 55.
59. 94 N.J. at 131, 462 A.2d at 1253.
60. Id at 131-32, 462 A.2d at 1253-54. One of the lower courts refused to recog-
nize the validity of the DPP classification by finding it a nullity. Id at 131, 462 A.2d
at 1253. The court then determined that the patients met the legal standards for com-
mitment and therefore were not eligible for discharge. Id at 131-32, 462 A.2d at
1253-54.
61. Id at 143, 462 A.2d at 1259-60. The court reversed the order continuing com-
mitment and remanded the cases for placement review hearings. Id at 143, 462 A.2d
at 1259-60.
62. Id at 140, 462 A.2d at 1258.
63. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In addressing the issue of justifications for civil commit-
ment, the Court stated:
We need not decide whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person
may be confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary
statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of such a per-
son-to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own survival or safety, or to
alleviate or cure his illness.
Id at 573-74 (citation omitted).
64. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). See supra note 16. The Wyatt court held
that if the state failed to satisfy its constitutional obligation to place the patients in the
least restrictive environment, the court would appoint a special master to oversee im-
plementation of its decree. 344 F. Supp. at 394. The Fifth Circuit affirmed and added
that the Governor must use his best efforts to obtain funds from the legislature to
implement the court's order. 503 F.2d at 1317. For a discussion of the use of special
masters and institutional reform, see Montgomery, Force and Will: An Exploration of
the Use oSpecial Masters to Implement Judicial Decrees, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 105
(1980-81); Nathan, The Use ofMasters in lnstitutionalReform, 10 U. TOL. L. REv. 419
(1979).
65. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. Many courts have refused to
follow Wyatt'r solution of forcing states to develop less restrictive facilities for pa-
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no longer meet the state's civil commitment standards?66 The court
refused to define the civil commitment standard of dangerousness in
terms of one's inability to take care of himself.67 The court stated
that such an interpretation would be overbroad and would allow
commitment solely for custodial care.68 The court's decision there-
fore limits the reach of the commitment statute only to those patients
who are dangerous to themselves or others through active conduct
rather than by passive inability to care for themselves. Although the
Supreme Court in O'Connor held that confinement for mere custodial
care is unconstitutional, 69 the Court also approved a broad definition
of "dangerousness." 7 Thus, the In re S.L. court arguably could have
constitutionally broadened its definition of "dangerousness" and
civilly committed the nine patients who were unable to care for them-
selves. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, discouraged con-
finement of nondangerous mentally ill patients in unnecessarily
restrictive conditions.7 While acknowledging that the state lacks the
tients who need care but cannot survive outside an institution. See, e.g., Gary W. v.
Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976).
The United States Supreme Court has expressed a policy of deference to the states
in the area of mental health. See Bryant, Pennhurst, Romeo, andRogers: The Burger
Court and Mental Health Law Reform Litigation, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 323, 330-38, 348
(1983)(Supreme Court's clear signal that it does not want federal courts overseeing
the operation of public mental health facilities means that conditions will not change
substantially and thus, patients' rights are merely theoretical).
66. 94 N.J. at 132, 462 A.2d at 1254. The court noted that if mentally ill individu-
als had the capacity to exist safely in freedom, then according to O'Connor, they
would be entitled to immediate release. Id at 138, 462 A.2d at 1257.
67. Id at 139, 462 A.2d at 1257. The New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a
Task Force on Mental Commitments that urged the court in its proposal to expand
New Jersey's standards of commitment to include individuals who by reason of
mental illness are unable to care for themselves without some supervision. The court
refused to expand the standards, stating:
To widen the net cast by the civil commitment process in the manner suggested
by the Task Force is inconsistent with the central purpose of the commitment
process. It would permit the State to commit individuals to mental institutions
solely to provide custodial care. This authority cannot be justified as a measure
to safeguard the citizenry under the police power. Nor is it a proper exercise of
the State's parenspatrae power because confinement in a mental hospital is not
necessary to provide the care needed by individuals who are simply incapable of
living independently.
Id
68. Id
69. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
71. 94 N.J. at 140, 462 A.2d at 1258. The court stated that individuals' rights must
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authority to commit nondangerous mentally ill individuals, the In re
S.L. court held that the state temporarily can retain committed pa-
tients who are no longer dangerous to ensure their placement in an
appropriate less restrictive setting.72
Although Wyatt also ordered placement in the least restrictive fa-
cility,73 In re S.L may be distinguished because it did not authorize
legal commitment for nondangerous patients.74 The patients, there-
fore, legally were entitled to re-enter the community.75
B. A New Approach to Treatment
In In re S.L., the New Jersey Supreme Court sanctioned the DPP
classification for previously committed patients76 and developed pro-
cedural safeguards to ensure that the state would pursue good faith
efforts to place patients in the least restrictive environments.77 The
court specifically stated that an individual, who is determined to be
"nondangerous," is entitled to leave the institution.78 If the court
finds that an individual is "nondangerous," the court must ascertain
whether the individual is capable of surviving without depending on
an institution.79 If the court finds the patient incapable of independ-
be protected by procedures that minimize restrictions on their liberty. Id See also
supra notes 3-5 & 32-50 and accompanying text.
72. 94 N.J. at 140, 462 A.2d at 1258. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying
text.
73. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19. See also 94 N.J. at 139, 462 A.2d at
1258. The court stated that the patients legally were entitled to leave the hospital.
The court added, however, that because of the effects of extensive periods of institu-
tionalization, the patients were incapable of competently exercising the right to leave.
Id
75. Wyatt is also distinguishable from In re S.L. because Wyatt concerned an ini-
tial commitment proceeding while In re S.L. concerned a commitment review hearing
for previously institutionalized patients. The Wyatt court focused on the type of com-
mitment mentally ill patients were entitled to after the court found that the patients
met commitment standards. The court determined that one constitutional require-
ment for confinement was commitment in the least restrictive environment. 344 F.
Supp. at 391-96. In contrast, the patients in In re S.L. were contesting the status of
their commitment. The court chose a restrictive placement as a means to avoid legal
commitment while maintaining care and supervision. 94 N.J. at 131, 140,462 A.2d at
1253, 1258.
76. 94 N.J. at 140, 462 A.2d at 1253, 1258.
77. Id at 140-42, 462 A.2d at 1258.
78. Id at 140, 462 A.2d at 1258.
79. Id
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ent survival, then the court must direct that the patient temporarily
remain in the institution and must schedule a placement review hear-
ing within sixty days."0 If a less restrictive placement is available, the
court must order confinement in that facility.81 If no alternative is
available, the patient must remain in the institution's least restrictive
setting with subsequent placement hearings scheduled every six
months.82 At these hearings, the court shall inquire into the state's
good faith efforts to find alternative placement.83
Justifying the DPP classification, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reasoned that the state could not "simply pull the rug from under
these people when they physically deteriorate to a point where they
are no longer dangerous."84 The court stated that although it lacked
the authority to continue confinement of nondangerous individuals, it
would not cast them adrift in the community.85 The In re S.L court
concluded that it constitutionally could confine patients for their pro-
tection pending foster placement. 86
The court's holding in In re S.L is consistent with New Jersey's
statutory requirements87 and its prior case law.88 New Jersey statutes
recognize that the mentally ill are entitled to fundamental civil rights,
medical care, and other professional services.89 The commitment
statute specifically states that the mentally ill are entitled to "the least
restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of treat-
80, Id
81. Id at 141, 462 A.2d at 1258.
82. Id.
83. Id at 141, 462 A.2d at 1258-59. The individual has the right to counsel at
placement hearings. The individual and his attorney have a right to notice of the time
and place of the hearing at least 10 days prior to the hearing date. The patient's
attorney is entitled to inspect and copy all records relating to the patient's condition
and placement, and may introduce evidence, offer testimony, and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses at the hearing. d at 142, 462 A.2d at 1259.
84. Id at 139, 462 A.2d at 1258.
85. Id at 140, 462 A.2d at 1258.
86. Id
87. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.1 (West 1981). The statute provides that
"[elvery individual who is mentally ill shall be entitled to fundamental civil rights,
and to medical care and other professional services in accordance with accepted stan-
dards, provided however that this shall not be construed to require capital construc-
tion." See also infra note 90 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975). See also supra note
56 and infra notes 91-92.
89. See supra note 87.
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ment."9° Providing further protection for the mentally ill, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held, in New Jersey Association for Retarded
Citizens v. Department of Human Services,9 that the state has a duty
to offer a spectrum of possible settings that furnish services and en-
sure the right to treatment in the least restrictive environment. 92
Although the New Jersey Associationfor Retarded Citizens decision
places a burden on the state to provide an array of treatment settings,
this duty is meaningless unless the legislature appropriates funds for
the development of alternative facilities. When addressing the judici-
ary's role in funding these facilities, the In re SL. court noted that
the legislature had the exclusive authority to appropriate funds and
that the judiciary could not compel the legislature to allocate money
to alternative treatment facilities.9 3 Without action by the legislature,
it is unclear how In re S.L. will affect the rights of nondangerous
mentally ill persons. The lack of alternative treatment facilities is
arguably a violation of the state's statutory and good faith obligation
to confine individuals in the least restrictive setting. The remedy,
however, for violating this duty is unclear.
IV. CONCLUSION
The New Jersey Supreme Court's approach in In re S.L. is, in the-
ory, a legally sound middle ground approach. The decision does not
go as far as O'Connor suggested by broadly defining "dangerousness"
to include persons unable to survive independently of an institu-
tion,9" nor does it follow Wyatt and order legal commitment in the
least restrictive environment. 95 Instead, by directing a DPP, the court
attempts to provide nondangerous mentally ill persons with the nec-
essary care while avoiding legal commitment. Thus, in theory, the
approach protects the patients' constitutional right to liberty.
The practical effect of In re SL. depends on the legislature's re-
sponse to the New Jersey Supreme Court's solution. Without fund-
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(e)(2) (West 1981).
91. 89 N.J. 234, 445 A.2d 704 (1982).
92. Id at 250-51, 445 A.2d at 712. The court stated that as a practical matter it is
impossible to provide a least restrictive setting if only one setting is available. There-
fore, it concluded that the legislature intended an array of settings. Id at 250, 445
A.2d at 712.
93. 94 N.J. at 133 n.5, 462 A.2d at 1254 n.5.
94. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/16
1984] CIVIL COMMITMENT 453
ing for additional treatment and care alternatives, In re S.L. may not
affect the continued practice of institutionalizing nondangerous men-
tally ill persons who could survive in settings that provide freer exer-
cise of their constitutional right to liberty.
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